


The new riddle of induction

tea talk at



the “old” riddle



DEDUCTION

general



specific

DEDUCTION

general



specific

all swan are white

A is a swan

DEDUCTION

general



specific

all swan are white

A is a swan



A is white

INDUCTION

specific



general

A is white

A is a swan



all swan are white

INDUCTION

specific



general

A is white

A is a swan

B is white

B is a swan



all swan are white

the sun came up today

the sun came up yesterday


the sun came up the day before yesterday

the sun came up today


the sun came up yesterday

the sun came up the day before yesterday

the sun will come up tomorrow




is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa



is a tufa

the “old” riddle:

how are these kinds of inferences justified?

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uniformity of nature

the “old” riddle:

how are these kinds of inferences justified?

uniformity of nature


how is uniformity of nature justified?

the new riddle

that is, are emeralds green or grue?

the new riddle

that is, are emeralds green or grue?



Nelson Goodman 1983
Fact, Fiction and Forecast



a green emerald



a green emerald



a green emerald



a green emerald



a green emerald




a green emerald



a green emerald



a green emerald



a green emerald

emeralds are green

(evidence supports theory)

DICTIONARY

bleen

if observed before t, blue; else, green

grue

if observed before t, green; else, blue



a grue emerald



a grue emerald




a grue emerald



a grue emerald



a grue emerald




a grue emerald



a grue emerald



a grue emerald



a grue emerald

emeralds are grue

(evidence supports theory)

DICTIONARY

green

green

grue

if observed before t, green; else, blue

DICTIONARY


green

green

grue

if observed before t, green; else, blue

elaborate definition,
use Occam's razor



DICTIONARY

green

green

grue

if observed before t, green; else, blue

MARTIAN'S DICTIONARY

grue

grue

green

if observed before t, grue; else, bleen

DICTIONARY

green

green

grue

if observed before t, green; else, blue

MARTIAN'S DICTIONARY

grue

grue

elaborate definition

green

if observed before t, grue; else, bleen



- “The US forces were always commanded by George Washington, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”

- “The US forces were always commanded by George Washington, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”
- “The US forces were always commanded by the US president, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”

- “The US forces were always commanded by George Washington, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”
- “The US forces were always commanded by the US president, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”
- “Mary Ball Washington was always the mother of George Washington, hence she will be his mother in the future”

- “The US forces were always commanded by George Washington, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”
- “The US forces were always commanded by the US president, hence they will be commanded by him in the future”
- “Mary Ball Washington was always the mother of George Washington, hence she will be his mother in the future”
- “Mary Ball Washington was always the mother of the US president, hence she will be his mother in the future”

- inductive inference is relative to the language it is formulated in

BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION

BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION

H1: emeralds are green

H2: emeralds are grue

BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION

posterior
over
models

$$\longleftarrow P(\mathcal{H}_i | D) \propto P(D | \mathcal{H}_i)P(\mathcal{H}_i)$$

BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION

posterior
over
models

$$\leftarrow P(\mathcal{H}_i | D) \propto P(D | \mathcal{H}_i) P(\mathcal{H}_i)$$

evidence
compatible
with both
grue and
green

BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION

posterior
over
models

$$\leftarrow P(\mathcal{H}_i | D) \propto P(D | \mathcal{H}_i) P(\mathcal{H}_i)$$

evidence
compatible
with both
grue and
green

model prior
decides

MINIMUM DESCRIPTION LENGTH

the best model is the one that leads to the best
compression of the observed data

MINIMUM DESCRIPTION LENGTH

$$L(D, \mathcal{H}) = L(\mathcal{H}) + L(D | \mathcal{H})$$

MINIMUM DESCRIPTION LENGTH

description
length ← $L(D, \mathcal{H}) = L(\mathcal{H}) + L(D | \mathcal{H})$

MINIMUM DESCRIPTION LENGTH

description
length

$$\leftarrow L(D, \mathcal{H}) = L(\mathcal{H}) + L(D | \mathcal{H})$$

length of
model
specification

MINIMUM DESCRIPTION LENGTH

description
length

$$\leftarrow L(D, \mathcal{H}) = L(\mathcal{H}) + L(D | \mathcal{H})$$

length of
model
specification

length of data
specification
given model

$$L(D, \mathcal{H}) = L(\mathcal{H}) + L(D | \mathcal{H})$$

Minimum Description Length

$$\begin{aligned} L(D, \mathcal{H}) &= -\log P(\mathcal{H}) - \log (P(D | \mathcal{H}) \delta D) \\ &= -\log P(\mathcal{H} | D) + \text{const.} \end{aligned}$$

Bayesian inference

$$L(D, \mathcal{H}) = L(\mathcal{H}) + L(D | \mathcal{H})$$

Minimum Description Length

Kraft inequality

$$P(\mathbf{x}) = 2^{-L(\mathbf{x})}, \quad L(\mathbf{x}) = -\log_2 P(\mathbf{x})$$

$$\begin{aligned} L(D, \mathcal{H}) &= -\log P(\mathcal{H}) - \log (P(D | \mathcal{H}) \delta D) \\ &= -\log P(\mathcal{H} | D) + \text{const.} \end{aligned}$$

Bayesian inference

$$L(D, \mathcal{H}) = \boxed{L(\mathcal{H})} + L(D | \mathcal{H})$$

Minimum Description Length

model language

Kraft inequality

$$P(\mathbf{x}) = 2^{-L(\mathbf{x})}, \quad L(\mathbf{x}) = -\log_2 P(\mathbf{x})$$

$$\begin{aligned} L(D, \mathcal{H}) &= -\log \boxed{P(\mathcal{H})} - \log (P(D | \mathcal{H}) \delta D) \\ &= -\log P(\mathcal{H} | D) + \text{const.} \end{aligned}$$

Bayesian inference

TURING MACHINES

“the subject must pick a (*universal*) Turing machine whose operations describe the basic operations believed to represent "simplicity" by the subject.

However, one could always choose a Turing machine with a simple operation that happened to construct one's entire theory and would hence score highly under the razor.”

- Goodman's problem - inductive inference is relative to the language it is formulated in

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- this problem appears in the formal approaches as well

- Goodman's problem - inductive inference is relative to the language it is formulated in
- this problem appears in the formal approaches as well
- how should we choose the language?



SOURCES

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/#GruParNewRidInd>

David McKay - Information Theory, Inference, and Learning Algorithms

<http://jeremykun.com/2012/04/21/kolmogorov-complexity-a-primer/>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam's_razor

- What is the difference between those generalizations that are supported by their instances and those that are not?
- Which generalizations support counterfactual conditionals?
- How are lawlike generalizations to be distinguished from accidental generalizations?